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WHEN MISREPRESENTATION
BECOMES DECEPTIVE: ANALYZING
PETITION-SIGNER INADVERTENCE
POST-CAMPBELL
Melissa English* and Daisy Gray**
ABSTRACT
In 2010, the Alaska supreme court held that a legally deficient petition
summary of a ballot initiative could be corrected and put on the ballot without
being recirculated for signatures. The Parental Involvement Initiative at the
root of the litigation would prohibit doctors from performing abortions for
unemancipated minor women who had not provided notice to or obtained
consent from a parent. After the petition was circulated for signatures, the
supreme court determined that omissions of fact in the petition summary
rendered the summary inaccurate and therefore deficient. However, the court
refused to require that the initiative sponsors recirculate the petition with a
corrected summary upon a determination that the deficient summary was
unlikely to have led to petition-signer inadvertence. This Comment critiques
the supreme court’s analysis of petition-signer inadvertence and proposes a
more robust standard that advances the policy goals the court has considered
when evaluating ballot initiatives.

I. INTRODUCTION
In Planned Parenthood v. Campbell,1 the Alaska supreme court
considered whether supporters of a defective petition summary must
recirculate it before a cured version is placed on the ballot.2 Upon a
challenge that the petition summary was defective, the supreme court
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1. 232 P.3d 725(Alaska 2010).
2. Id. at 727. The petition summary, “The Parental Involvement Initiative:
An act relating to parental involvement for a minor’s abortion,” (PNI) would
prohibit doctors from performing abortions for unemancipated minor women
who had not provided notice to or obtained consent from a parent.
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held that it was not necessary to correct and recirculate the petition
because petition-signer inadvertence was unlikely or minimal.3 However,
the supreme court failed to engage in a clear analysis of petition-signer
inadvertence.
The Comment addresses that failure and argues that courts should
apply a standard that ensures petition signatures accurately reflect public
opinion and are not the result of misleading petitions. Part II details the
case history of Campbell. Part III discusses the policy reasons for analyzing
deficient petition summaries through petition-signer inadvertence by
examining previous cases before the supreme court. Part IV develops a
standard that courts ought to apply in determining whether petitionsigner inadvertence occurs and argues that the supreme court incorrectly
determined that the petition summary in Campbell did not need to be
recirculated.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In Campbell, the court sought to resolve whether a deficient petition
summary could be cured for a ballot summary without its sponsors
circulating new petitions and gathering new signatures.4 The petition
sponsors submitted “The Parental Involvement Initiative: An Act relating
to parental involvement for a minor’s abortion” (PNI) to the lieutenant
governor.5 The PNI would prohibit doctors from performing abortions
for unemancipated minor women who had not provided notice to or
obtained consent from a parent.6
The PNI was proposed as an amendment to the Parental Consent Act
(PCA), a similar statute requiring parental consent or judicial
authorization before a doctor performed an abortion on a unmarried or
emancipated woman who was under the age of 17.7 The PCA was
invalidated for violating the minor’s right to privacy under the Alaska
constitution because it was not the least restrictive means available to
accomplish the state’s legitimate interest in “protecting the health of the
minor and in fostering family involvement in a minor’s decision
regarding her pregnancy.”8
When the petition sponsors submitted the PNI, the lieutenant
governor certified the application, and the Division of Elections prepared

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 728.
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the necessary materials for signature-gathering.9 Planned Parenthood of
Alaska filed suit in the superior court against the lieutenant governor,
alleging that he had violated both the statutory and constitutional law of
Alaska by “certifying the application and adopting a defective
summary.”10 Planned Parenthood claimed that the PNI was
“incomprehensible and would mislead voters” and that the summary was
not impartial or accurate as required by law.11
Reviewing Planned Parenthood’s claims, the superior court held that
the PNI was not clearly unconstitutional but was not impartial or accurate
due to the omission of three key facts.12 First, the summary omitted the
fact that the PNI would restrict current law because current law does not
require parental notification for a minor to get an abortion.13 Second, the
summary failed to disclose that the PNI was modifying the PCA by
requiring parental notification.14 Finally, the PNI omitted the fact that the
initiative would implicate other laws that make it a criminal offense when
a physician knowingly violates the notification requirements for giving
the minor’s parents notice of the minor’s plan to have an abortion.15 The
superior court held that if the omitted facts were included in a revised
summary for the ballot, the initiative could be placed on the ballot.16
Planned Parenthood appealed, arguing that the summary could not be
corrected for the ballot without recirculating a revised summary and
gathering new signatures.17
Practically, correcting and recirculating a new summary would have
allowed signers to reconsider their endorsement of the initiative with a
clearer explanation of the initiative. Thus, it would have been possible
that the initiative would not have gotten enough signatures to be placed
on the ballot at all. In contrast, correcting the summary for the ballot
would not allow for this reconsideration. Rather, it would guarantee that
the summary ended up on the ballot despite the fact that a clearer
summary may have led signers to change their minds.
The supreme court reviewed the superior court’s decision de novo
and would only invalidate the summary if it was not impartial and
accurate.18 The mere fact that a better summary could be written was not

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 727.
Id. at 727–28.
Id. at 728.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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enough to invalidate the summary as it stood.19 The supreme court
concluded that when dealing with initiative petitions that have been
“circulated with a defective summary,” a court is required to consider the
nature and degree of the omission or misleading statement to determine
the “likelihood and extent of petition-signer inadvertence,” the hardship
that would result from the invalidation to the sponsors, and the hardship
that would come to the opponents from permitting the initiative to move
forward.20 The supreme court then concluded that petition-signer
inadvertence “was unlikely or minimal in this case.”21 Therefore, the
supreme court found that it was not necessary to correct and recirculate
the petition, provided that the omissions were corrected before the
summary was placed on the ballot.22
In his opinion concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part, Justice Winfree
disagreed with the majority, noting that the inaccuracy of the petition
summary violated the screening function of the signature requirement
because it was impossible to know whether the initiative would have had
support if it had been presented correctly.23 He noted that although the
hardship involved in circulating a new petition is great, not requiring this
recirculation would lessen incentives for creating impartial petition
summaries.24 Also, it would change the screening standard from what is
currently a bright-line rule to be dependent on the independent views of
judges.25 Therefore, he argued that the initiative should not be included
on the ballot and a new, accurate and impartial petition should be
circulated.26

III. PETITION-SIGNER INADVERTENCE IN THE SUPREME COURT
This section will provide an overview of the cases that have
discussed the policy goals of avoiding petition-signer inadvertence before
discussing how the Campbell court applied these cases to its analysis. In
analyzing the PNI, the supreme court relied upon severance cases, cases
where the proposed initiative impermissibly combines two subjects and
violates the one-subject rule, in formulating a rule for petition-signer
inadvertence.27 Planned Parenthood argued against the applicability of
these cases in analyzing the PNI, but the supreme court found sufficient
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id. at 734.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 736 (Winfree, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 739.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 732–33 (majority order).
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similarities to make the severance cases instructive to petition-signer
inadvertence.28 In both situations, proponents of the initiatives gathered
signatures on petitions that did not exactly represent the initiative.29 In
both situations, it is necessary to determine whether the petitions have
served their “screening purpose” sufficiently to allow the initiative to go
on the ballot without requiring the recirculation of the petition.30
Therefore, examining severance cases decided by the supreme court is
necessary to determine the standard for petition-signer inadvertence
applied in Campbell.
A.

Suber v. Alaska State Bond Committee

The Alaska constitution stipulates that “[e]very bill shall be confined
to one subject.”31 In Suber v. Alaska State Bond Committee,32 the supreme
court determined a chapter of a special session contained only one subject
when it imposed both obligations on the State Commissioner of
Commerce regarding homeowner relief following an earthquake and
criminal sanctions for noncompliance.33 Emphasizing that the purpose
underlying the one-subject provision is to prevent logrolling,
“inadvertence, stealth, and fraud in legislation,” the court noted that,
when construing a contested provision, it would “disregard mere verbal
inaccuracies, resolve doubts in favor of validity, and hold that in order to
warrant the setting aside of enactments for failure to comply, the violation
must be substantial and plain.”34 Accordingly, the court reasoned that
because the purpose of the criminal sanctions provision was to ensure
compliance with the homeowner relief provision, the sanctions provision
was sufficiently germane to the subject matter of the legislation for it to
adhere to the one-subject rule.35 The standards set out in Suber for
determining inadvertence are helpful in determining whether the court
in Campbell properly held that petition-signer inadvertence was unlikely.
B.

Meyer v. Alaskans for Better Elections
The supreme court’s analysis of a one-subject rule challenge to an

28. Id.
29. Id. at 733.
30. Id. (quoting Faipeas v. Municipality of Anchorage, 860 P.2d 1214, 1219
(Alaska 1993)).
31. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 8.
32. 414 P.2d 546 (Alaska 1966).
33. Id. at 549, 557.
34. Id. at 557.
35. Id.
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initiative in Meyer v. Alaskans for Better Elections36 clarifies the policy goals
of the one-subject rule and reflects the general tendency in one-subject
cases to permit subjects that fall under a single broad category.37 In Meyer,
the court determined that an initiative that would make three discrete
substantive changes to election law was permissible when the three
changes fell under one general subject. The court noted among other
considerations, that there was “no transparent attempt to garner voter
support through completely unrelated provisions.”38 The court clarified
that the test was not discreteness or severability; rather, there must be a
factual and logical nexus between the different issues.39 Thus, the policy
underlying the one-subject rule was empowering voters, because
allowing them to vote on different issues separately would lead to a more
precise expression of their will.40 This policy informs the goal of avoiding
petition-signer inadvertence as well, as petition-signer inadvertence
could prevent a precise expression of a signer’s will.
C.

Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana v. Municipality of
Anchorage

The court reiterated a focus on voter empowerment in Citizens for
Implementing Medical Marijuana v. Municipality of Anchorage,41 where the
supreme court held that the clerk properly denied a petition that was
“confusing and misleading and therefore legally insufficient.”42 The
petition was unclear whether it would create or abolish rights relating to
the use of medical marijuana. Therefore, signers had to infer the effects of
the petition.43 The court, noting the principle of informed lawmaking that
underlies all petition requirements,44 held that the lack of context
36. 465 P.3d 477 (Alaska 2020).
37. E.g., Croft v. Parnell, 236 P.3d 369, 372–73 (Alaska 2010) (explaining that
the court tends to interpret the one-subject rule broadly in order to balance the
purposes of the rule with legislative efficiency).
38. Meyer, 464 P.3d at 498.
39. Id. at 492.
40. See id. at 498 (citing Croft, 236 P.2d at 372) (in the initiative context the onesubject rule, “protects the voters’ ability to effectively exercise their right to vote
by requiring that different proposals be voted on separately,” “allows voters to
express their will through their votes more precisely,” and “prevents logrolling,
stealth, and fraud.”).
41. 119P.3d 898 (Alaska 2006).
42. Id. at 899.
43. Id. at 903.
44. Id. The court in Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana was referring
to the decision in Faipeas, which noted that there is a “vital public interest in
ensuring that laws be made by informed lawmakers.” Decision-makers should
have a thorough understanding of all sides of an issue so that they can make a
reasoned and rational decision. The court noted that this understanding requires
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surrounding the medical marijuana petition was legally insufficient
because signers “could not know with sufficient certainty what they were
endorsing.”45 The holding in Medical Marijuana suggests that
inadvertence also occurs when a voter could not know, without having to
draw inferences from the surrounding context, the effect of a petition
when endorsing it.
D.

Faipeas v. Municipality of Anchorage

Similarly, the policy surrounding the non-allowance of a deficient
petition summary centers on the importance of an informed electorate.
For example, in Faipeas v. Municipality of Anchorage,46 Citizens Against the
Homosexual Ordinance filed a petition for a referendum on an ordinance
that prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation for public
employment.47 Opponents of the ordinance appealed the clerk’s
certification of the petition, seeking a stay of the election pending the final
decision of their appeal.48 Granting the stay, the supreme court found that
the ordinance was misleading because it could be interpreted by
proponents as adding sexual orientation to the list of characteristics
protected from discrimination in public employment, or by opponents as
giving special rights to homosexuals.49 The court explained that the
signature-gathering requirement to submit a referendum ensures that a
bill has sufficient public support before being placed on the ballot.50 A
petition that mischaracterizes the ordinance thwarts the intended
screening function of the signature-gathering requirement.51 The court
noted that having a properly informed electorate is “a basic requirement
for good governing decisions – ones which properly balance the interests
of those involved and create desirable results.”52 Therefore, referendum
and initiative petitions must meet minimum standards of accuracy and
fairness to satisfy the public interest in informed lawmaking to prevent
inadvertence by petition-signers and voters.53

complete and accurate information. Faipeas v. Municipality of Anchorage, 860
P.2d 1214, 1221 (Alaska 1993).
45. Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana, 129 P.3d at 903.
46. 860 P.2d 1214 (Alaska 1993).
47. Id. at 1215.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1217.
50. Id. at 1219–20.
51. Id. at 1220.
52. Id. at 1221.
53. Id.
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IV. CREATING A STANDARD FOR EVALUATING PETITION-SIGNER
INADVERTENCE
A.

The Need for a Workable Standard

Although the supreme court premised its Campbell decision on a
determination that petition-signer inadvertence was “unlikely or
minimal,” it did not engage with a clear analysis of petition-signer
inadvertence.54 Where the supreme court has previously tested the
sufficiency of petition summaries in the initiative context, it has similarly
failed to articulate a clear standard to evaluate inadvertence.55 Given the
prevalence of legislation by initiative in Alaska, a clear, consistent
standard for courts assessing inadvertence is paramount to protect the
democratic process.56 The supreme court’s discussion of policy goals
underlying both the one-subject rule and deficient summaries provides a
jumping-off point for how the court handles inadvertence. This section
seeks to ascertain the policy goals undergirding petition-signer
inadvertence and to crystalize these goals into a workable standard for
future application. Both the one-subject rule and the need for fair and
accurate summaries empower voters to express preferences in a clear and
precise manner.57 Courts have analyzed inadvertence in cases involving
the one-subject rule literally, centering concerns on the likelihood that a
bill containing two distinct subjects would lead to support for one of the
provisions falsely indicating support for the other.58
The supreme court has focused more on ensuring that summaries
allow voters to make decisions based on accurate and impartial
information than it has on ensuring summaries are not deceptive.59 While
the court holds both ballot summaries and petition summaries to the
standard of accuracy, the purpose of ballot summaries is to allow voters
to make “informed and intelligent” decisions while petition summaries

54. Planned Parenthood of Alaska v. Campbell, 232 P.3d 725, 734 (Alaska
2010).
55. See, e.g., Faipeas, 860 P.2d at 1221 (noting the necessity of guarding against
petition-signer inadvertence but not explaining how to evaluate inadvertence).
56. See Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney, 71 P.3d 896, 898 (Alaska 2003)
(noting that Alaska allows for voter initiatives to encourage direct democracy).
57. See Croft v. Parnell, 236 P.3d 369, 372 (Alaska 2010) (explaining that the
one-subject rule allows voters a more precise expression of their preferences); see
also Faipeas, 860 P.2d at 1221 (“The public interest in informed lawmaking requires
that referendum and initiative petitions meet minimum standards of accuracy and
fairness.”).
58. See supra note 40.
59. Planned Parenthood of Alaska v. Campbell, 232 P.3d 725, 729 (Alaska
2010).
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ensure the measure reflects public support.60 The court noted that when
petition summaries exclude information that would give petition signers
“serious grounds for reflection,” these omissions can render a petition
inaccurate.61 Similarly, “complete and accurate information” in a petition
summary is necessary to ensure informed lawmaking.62
The procedural posture of the case in Campbell was unique, because
the court confronted whether a deficient summary could be cured
without recirculation. Before analyzing how to cure a deficient petition
summary, the court had concluded that the summary was not complete
and accurate.63 Accordingly, the holding that a deficient summary does
not always lead to petition-signer inadvertence implies that the standard
to determine inadvertence is narrower than completeness.64
The supreme court noted in Medical Marijuana that the petition
process serves to screen out propositions with insufficient public
support.65 Although the court acknowledged the screening function in
Campbell, it ignored its own analysis of the importance of legal sufficiency
at this stage as applied in Medical Marijuana.66 There, the court explained,
“[s]ignatures on a confusing or misleading petition therefore may or may
not indicate support for the measure . . .,” suggesting that the importance
of completeness of information directly relates to ensuring petition
signatures are an effective proxy for public support.67 This concern
comports with the idea of inadvertence that the court espoused in the
context of the one-subject rule, which indicates petition-signer
inadvertence occurs when a deficient summary inhibits petition signers
from clearly expressing their preferences.68 Accordingly, when
considering whether a petition summary contains complete information,
courts should do so with an eye to whether a lack of completeness will
60. Id. at 730 (citing Alaskans for Efficient Government, Inc. v. State, 52 P.3d
732, 735 (Alaska 2002)).
61. Id. at 730 (citing Pebble Ltd. Partnership ex rel. Pebble Mines Corp. v.
Parnell, 215 P.3d 1064, 1082 (Alaska 2009) (quoting Alaskans for Efficient
Government, 52 P.3d at 736)).
62. See Faipeas v. Municipality of Anchorage, 860 P.2d 1214, 1221 (Alaska
1993) (explaining that clarity and honesty in all forms of lawmaking, including
“legislative enactments, initiative petitions and even proposed resolutions” is
paramount).
63. Campbell, 232 P.2d at 730.
64. See id. at 734 (noting that while the petition summary was deficient by
omission, it was not misleading enough to automatically require recirculation).
65. Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 129 P.3d 898, 901 (Alaska 2006).
66. See Campbell, 232 P.2d at 729 (explaining the screening function ensures
that initiatives that make it to the ballot have public support, but failing to
mention the effect that initiatives without public support on the ballot may have).
67. Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana, 129 P.3d at 901.
68. See supra note 40.
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render signatures an insufficient indicator of public support.
The Campbell court’s application of standards used in the one-subject
context to determine whether a deficient petition nevertheless served its
screening purpose highlights that the two issues implicate similar policy
goals.69 In determining that petition-signer inadvertence was unlikely, the
supreme court noted that the “omissions did not substantially
misrepresent the essential nature of the PNI.”70 This resembles the
language that courts use in determining whether severance can
effectively remedy a violation of the one-subject rule, where courts “ask
whether omitting the required information from the petition summary
substantially changed—or misrepresented—the spirit of the measure.”71
While a cursory glance at this portion of the court’s opinion may lead
to the conclusion that it articulated a standard, the problem is that it failed
to clearly identify the cutoff point at which a summary that is legally
deficient can only be remedied by recirculation. The demarcation between
an omission that would give voters “serious grounds for reflection” and
one that “substantially . . . misrepresented . . . the spirit of the measure”
is amorphous at best.72 Justice Winfree highlights this issue in his opinion,
noting “a petition summary either meets our existing standards or it does
not.”73 The lack of clarity is problematic because it opens the door to
inconsistent application by courts, obscuring the central policy goal of
ensuring petition signatures convey public support.74
Because the Alaska supreme court carved out a gray area where “a
petition summary . . . fall[s] below those existing standards but [can] be
excused because it only falls a little bit below those standards” a stricter
inquiry is necessary.75 An appropriate standard would incorporate the
policy that the court articulated in Medical Marijuana, asking courts to not
only look to whether the omission substantially changed or
misrepresented the spirit of the measure, but also the likelihood that a
voter’s signature would not necessarily convey support for the measure.76
69. See Campbell, 232 P.2d at 733 (determining that two of the three factors
that courts consider in the one-subject rule context can apply in a deficient
summary context).
70. Id. at 734.
71. Id.
72. See id. (noting that a deficient summary that would give voters “serious
grounds for reflection” does not necessarily substantially misrepresent “the spirit
of the measure”).
73. Id. at 737 (Winfree, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. See Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 129 P.3d 898, 901–02 (Alaska 2006) (explaining that signatures on
misleading petitions may not accurately reflect public support).
75. See Campbell, 232 P.2d at 737 (Winfree, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
76. See Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana, 129 P.3d at 901–02
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In doing so, courts should consider whether the initiative summary
clearly states whether the measure creates or abolishes rights and whether
a reasonable voter would have to infer the effect of the proposition.77 To
that end, in determining petition-signer inadvertence, Alaskan courts
ought to examine not only the misrepresentation contained in the petition
summary itself, but also the extent to which that misrepresentation would
affect voters’ ability to understand the effect of the measure.
B.

Applying the Standard to Campbell

Given the policy goals of the screening function of the petition
process explained in Medical Marijuana, the court incorrectly determined
in Campbell that the deficient summary did not need to be recirculated.78
The conclusion in Campbell underscores how an unworkable standard
misleads courts and generates inconsistencies.79 Directly applicable to the
issue in Campbell is the court’s determination in Medical Marijuana that the
proposed initiative was ambiguous about whether it created or restricted
rights.80 A significant factor for finding the petition legally deficient in
Campbell was the absence of language clarifying that the proposal would
restrict current law.81 Despite this finding, the court failed to engage in
meaningful discussion about whether a reasonable petition signer in
Alaska would be sufficiently appraised of the current legal landscape
regarding voter laws to be fully aware of the impact of the PNI, or
whether she would have to “infer the effect of the proposition from other
sources.”82
The court similarly concluded that the PNI petition was deficient
because it failed to describe that the enforcement mechanism of the
proposed initiative would impose criminal liability on doctors

(acknowledging that signatures on a deficient summary may be the result of voter
confusion).
77. See id. at 903 (noting that a reader of the proposition “would have to infer
the effect of the proposition from other sources” because the proposition was
ambiguous).
78. Campbell, 232 P.3d at 734; see Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana,
129 P.3d at 901 (explaining that circulating a petition for signatures ensure that
measures on the ballot have garnered sufficient public support).
79. See Campbell, 232 P.3d at 734 (determining that a legally deficient
summary will not always need to be recirculated).
80. See id. at 730 (concluding that the petition summary was deficient in part
because it omitted that the PNI would restrict current law).
81. Id. at 728.
82. Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana, 129 P.3d at 903; see Campbell,
232 P.3d at 734 (explaining that petition-signer inadvertence was unlikely because
the deficient summary did not substantially misrepresent the PNI).
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performing abortions.83 In dicta, the Medical Marijuana court noted that a
petition that does not sufficiently describe the scope of a measure could
be legally deficient because it could be misleading.84 The court should
have applied that legal reasoning in Campbell. Because felony punishment
for doctors was the “primary enforcement mechanism” for the PNI, it was
“a main feature of the initiative.”85 This omission could mislead voters
because it would create “entirely new legal responsibilities” for
physicians.86 Like in Medical Marijuana, a voter’s perception of whether
the initiative imposed narrow or broad obligations could influence her
vote.87 A reasonable voter would be justified in inquiring who bears the
burden of enforcement. Because of the potential confusion that could arise
from the absence of information on enforcement, the petition could
mislead voters.
This analysis best serves the initiative process by prioritizing
informed lawmaking.88 Because the summary was legally deficient, and
that deficiency could lead to petition signers having to infer the effect of
the initiative, petition signers “could not know with sufficient certainty
what they were endorsing.”89 Accordingly, a higher standard for petitionsigner inadvertence would best ensure that measures that go on the ballot
are endorsed by a knowledgeable public.

83. Campbell, 232 P.3d at 730.
84. See Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana, 129 P.3d at 903
(“Although we do not have to decide the issue here, we note in passing that the
text of the proposition might also be misleading in regards to its scope.”).
85. Campbell, 232 P.3d at 730.
86. Brief of Cross-Appellees at 16, Planned Parenthood of Alaska v.
Campbell, 232 P.3d 725 (2010) (Nos. S–13826, S–13835, S–13845).
87. See Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana, 129 P.3d at 903 (“Because
this ambiguity in the text of the initiative might cause voters to sign the petition
who would not sign if they perceived the broader possible reading, the text itself
is potentially problematic.”).
88. See id. at 903 (“The uncertainty created by this lack of context violates the
principle of informed lawmaking that underlies all petition requirements.”).
89. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The supreme court’s determination in Campbell that a deficient
petition summary did not need to be recirculated for signatures created a
distinction between summaries that are legally insufficient and ones that
are incapable of serving their intended purpose. However, in creating this
distinction, the court provided little information on what standards
guided its decision in Campbell, or how future courts should approach the
issue. The policy goals that the supreme court has emphasized in the
initiative context are therefore instructive, particularly the importance of
ensuring that petition signatures appropriately reflect public support. To
ensure that signatures are an effective proxy for public support, Alaskan
courts ought to explicitly consider how misrepresentation in petition
summaries impact voters’ understanding of the measure. Accordingly,
while the supreme court erred in Campbell, analyzing petition-signer
inadvertence with a deliberate focus on the summary’s effect on the voters
will ensure that informed lawmaking continues to remain central to the
initiative process.

